When TikTok laid off more than 450 employees from its technology division in 2025, including a dramatic workforce reduction at Tokopedia—cutting the platform’s headcount to just 10% of the roughly 2,500 employees it had when TikTok acquired control from GoTo in January—investors braced for a potential earnings hit. The layoffs were substantial, reflecting TikTok’s U.S. e-commerce team’s failure to meet 2024 performance goals and new headwinds from tariff increases affecting sellers based in China. Yet despite this significant restructuring, GoTo explicitly stated that the TikTok Shop-Tokopedia layoffs would not materially impact its earnings.
This proved accurate. Rather than a drag on the company’s financial performance, GoTo’s overall business accelerated through 2025, driven by stronger segments outside of e-commerce and a newly profitable fintech operation. The disconnect between layoffs and earnings reveals how venture-backed tech companies often carry unprofitable business units alongside healthy ones. GoTo had already been consolidating Tokopedia into its operations since taking back control, and the layoffs represented a strategic realignment rather than a crisis response. The company’s e-commerce service fees remained unchanged and unaffected by headcount decisions, insulating GoTo’s reported results from operational changes at Tokopedia.
Table of Contents
- Why Did TikTok Shop’s U.S. Operations Fail, and What Does It Mean for GoTo?
- How GoTo Maintained Strong Earnings While Shuttering a Major Division
- The Tokopedia Workforce Reduction and What It Signals
- Revenue from Logistics and Fintech: The Actual Drivers of GoTo’s Growth
- 2025 Guidance Beats and What That Means for 2026
- The Profitability Milestone: GoTo’s First Quarterly Net Profit
- Fintech as the Engine: GoPay’s Path to Profitability and Its Implications
- Frequently Asked Questions
Why Did TikTok Shop’s U.S. Operations Fail, and What Does It Mean for GoTo?
TikTok’s U.S. e-commerce initiative suffered from a classic tech-company problem: aggressive growth targets that market conditions could not support. After failing to hit 2024 performance goals, ByteDance leadership conducted a review of the U.S. e-commerce team and concluded that significant workforce reductions were necessary. The problem wasn’t limited to execution—tariff increases on goods shipped from China, where many of TikTok’s sellers operate, raised the cost structure for the business model itself.
This is a real constraint: a platform selling Chinese-manufactured goods at competitive prices cannot easily absorb tariff increases without passing costs to sellers or buyers, both of whom have alternatives. For GoTo, this represented an external problem that required no response from management. GoTo had already extracted value from the Tokopedia control and was positioned to benefit from service fees regardless of transaction volume. The lesson here is that e-commerce platforms are vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and tariff policy in ways that fintech or mobility operations are not. GoTo’s strategy of diversifying into payment processing and ride-hailing positioned it to weather the e-commerce slowdown.
How GoTo Maintained Strong Earnings While Shuttering a Major Division
GoTo’s business model insulates it from the e-commerce unit’s performance because it charges service fees on transactions processed through Tokopedia rather than taking a cut of seller revenue. This structural separation meant that Tokopedia could shrink its team, reduce operational spending, and refocus on profitability without affecting GoTo’s revenue recognition. In 2025, GoTo reported adjusted EBITDA of IDR 2 trillion, a staggering 544% year-on-year increase. Full-year net revenue grew 24% year-on-year to IDR 18.3 trillion.
These aren’t modest improvements—they represent a company hitting escape velocity. The limitation to watch: e-commerce fees still represent a meaningful revenue stream, even if not material to earnings. A sustained decline in Tokopedia’s transaction volume could eventually pressure GoTo’s overall metrics. Additionally, the aggressive cost-cutting at Tokopedia could impact long-term competitive positioning if not managed carefully. A platform with 10% of its prior workforce may struggle to innovate or respond to competitive threats from better-capitalized rivals.
The Tokopedia Workforce Reduction and What It Signals
Tokopedia went from approximately 2,500 employees to around 250 employees—a 90% reduction in headcount. This is not a gradual optimization; it is a complete restructuring. For context, when most tech companies cut 15-20% of staff, it is treated as a major news event.
A 90% reduction suggests that TikTok and GoTo determined much of Tokopedia’s operational complexity was unnecessary, perhaps the result of legacy hiring decisions or organizational bloat from rapid growth. The real-world implication: large staff reductions of this magnitude typically come with severance costs, potential service disruptions during transition, and loss of institutional knowledge. GoTo chose to absorb these short-term costs to reduce ongoing operating expenses. The fact that they did so without warning that earnings would be affected indicates that the team managing GoTo’s financial projections was confident that Tokopedia’s revenue stream—not its operational size—was what mattered to the bottom line.
Revenue from Logistics and Fintech: The Actual Drivers of GoTo’s Growth
If e-commerce is not the growth engine, what is? GoTo’s Fintech segment, particularly GoPay, achieved profitability in 2025 for the first time with adjusted EBITDA reaching IDR 497 billion. The company’s Mobility and Delivery Services (ODS) segment contributed substantial profits as well. These are recurring-revenue, sticky-customer businesses that generate margins on scale far superior to marketplace take-rates.
Comparing the two: a 2% take-rate on a Tokopedia transaction is fragile and low-margin, while payment processing on a GoPay wallet transaction is profitable with less competition. GoTo’s strategic shift toward fintech and mobility reflects a recognition that those businesses have better unit economics and lower sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks. The tradeoff is that growth in those segments happens at a different pace than growth in marketplace GMV, requiring patience from investors accustomed to seeing headline transaction volumes climb.
2025 Guidance Beats and What That Means for 2026
GoTo initially provided 2025 adjusted EBITDA guidance of IDR 1.4-1.6 trillion. By the end of the year, the company raised that guidance to IDR 1.8-1.9 trillion and ultimately reported adjusted EBITDA of IDR 2 trillion. This is a raise of more than 25% from the midpoint of initial guidance and represents a company that beat its own expectations substantially. Such beats suggest either conservative guidance-setting at the start of the year or genuine operational improvements that surprised even management.
The warning: companies that beat guidance by this magnitude may have been sandbagging expectations to ensure a “beat” narrative. Alternatively, macroeconomic conditions shifted favorably. Either way, investors should scrutinize 2026 guidance carefully to determine whether the company is building in adequate conservatism. GoTo’s 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance is IDR 3.2-3.4 trillion (USD 190-200 million), with Fintech expected to contribute IDR 1.4-1.5 trillion and ODS at IDR 1.7-1.8 trillion. The midpoint of this guidance is a 79% increase from 2025’s actual result, suggesting either strong confidence in growth or an expectation that additional margin expansion will occur as fixed costs are absorbed across higher revenue.
The Profitability Milestone: GoTo’s First Quarterly Net Profit
In Q1 2026, GoTo reported its first-ever quarterly net profit of IDR 258 billion ($14.9 million) with revenue increasing 26% to IDR 5.34 trillion. This is a symbolic milestone for a company that has operated at a loss or near-breakeven for years.
Reaching profitability on a quarterly basis indicates that the cost structure is sustainable and that the path to continued profitability is visible to management. The example: a fintech company that has been subsidizing customer acquisition for years can reach profitability when customer retention improves and per-customer lifetime value exceeds acquisition cost. GoPay appears to have crossed that threshold, with the profitability milestone validating years of investment in payment infrastructure and customer onboarding.
Fintech as the Engine: GoPay’s Path to Profitability and Its Implications
GoPay’s achievement of profitability in 2025 with IDR 497 billion in adjusted EBITDA is the most important detail in GoTo’s recent earnings. This segment will represent approximately 45% of the company’s 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance (IDR 1.4-1.5 trillion out of IDR 3.2-3.4 trillion total). The shift toward fintech profitability means GoTo has successfully transitioned from a marketplace-dependent business model to a payment-processing-dependent one.
For stakeholders evaluating GoTo’s long-term resilience, the fintech profitability is the answer to the question posed by the Tokopedia layoffs: the company does not need an enormous e-commerce operation to be profitable. GoPay and mobility services generate sufficient cash flow to fund operations and return value to shareholders, with marketplace fees as a secondary contributor. The TikTok Shop restructuring was therefore less of a necessity and more of a recognition that GoTo’s capital was better deployed in segments that had already demonstrated profitability at scale.
Frequently Asked Questions
Did the 450-person layoff at TikTok Shop affect GoTo’s earnings?
No. GoTo explicitly stated the layoffs would not materially impact earnings because the company charges service fees on Tokopedia transactions rather than taking a cut of transaction volume. Tokopedia’s revenue stream was unaffected by headcount decisions.
Why did TikTok’s U.S. e-commerce team fail?
The team failed to meet 2024 performance goals, and tariff increases on Chinese goods—where many sellers are based—raised operational costs that couldn’t be passed along profitably to customers or sellers.
What drives GoTo’s profitability if not e-commerce?
GoPay (fintech) and ODS (mobility and delivery services) are the primary profit engines. GoPay achieved profitability in 2025 with IDR 497 billion in adjusted EBITDA, representing approximately 45% of projected 2026 earnings.
Did GoTo beat its 2025 earnings guidance?
Yes substantially. Initial guidance was IDR 1.4-1.6 trillion adjusted EBITDA. GoTo raised guidance to IDR 1.8-1.9 trillion and reported actual adjusted EBITDA of IDR 2 trillion, a beat of approximately 25% from midpoint.
What is GoTo’s 2026 outlook?
GoTo projects 2026 adjusted EBITDA of IDR 3.2-3.4 trillion (USD 190-200 million), with Fintech at IDR 1.4-1.5 trillion and ODS at IDR 1.7-1.8 trillion—a 79% increase from 2025 actual results.
When did GoTo become profitable?
GoTo reported its first-ever quarterly net profit of IDR 258 billion ($14.9 million) in Q1 2026, with revenue increasing 26% to IDR 5.34 trillion in that quarter.
